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I

Three's Company?
How American Law Can Recognize a Third Social
Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families
Laura Nicole Althouse*
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 2, 2007, the Court of Appeal of Ontario broke new ground
by allowing the appeal of a Canadian family seeking legal recognition for
three parents.' The Court described a family structure becoming more
common throughout the developed western world:
Five-year-old D.D. has three parents: his biological father and
mother (B.B. and C.C., respectively) and C.C.'s partner, the
appellant A.A. A.A. and C.C. have been in a stable same-sex
union since 1990. In 1999, they decided to start a family with the
assistance of their friend B.B. The two women would be the
primary caregivers of the child, but they believed it would be in the
child's best interests that B.B. remain involved in the child's life.
D.D. was born in 2001. He refers to A.A. and C.C. as his
mothers. 2
D.D.'s nonbiological mother, A.A., sought a declaration of parentage.3
She and the child's biological mother had not pursued an adoption order
because under Canadian law D.D.'s father would have lost his parental
status if a second-parent adoption had been ordered.4 The Court held that
the Children's Law Reform Act 5 contained a legislative gap to the extent
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1. A.A. v. B.B., 83 O.R.3d 561 (2007).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 564.
4. A.A., 83 O.R.3d at 564.
5. Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O., ch. C 12 (1990).
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that it did not address the possibility of parenting by same-sex partners. 6
Therefore, the Court was able to exercise parens patrie jurisdiction to
bridge the legislative gap and ensure equality. 7 The Court issued a
declaration that A.A. was the mother of D.D., allowing the child to have
three legal parents.8
A three-parent family structure is becoming increasingly common in
the United States. For example, lesbian couples often opt to use known
sperm donors who have social relationships with the children they help
create. 9 Additionally, in a newer trend, American women are choosing to
help gay male couples have babies by serving as surrogate mothers.' 0 Gay
couples have earned the reputation of being "especially grateful clients"
because they are better able to meet a surrogate's desires for an emotional
connection as well as integration and understanding between the
surrogate's family and the new family she has helped create by carrying a
child for the gay couple." Surrogates who work with gay couples are also
often much more involved in early parenting duties.12 Some of these
surrogates act as a third social parent in these families, or at least maintain
their connections with the family as the child grows up.
The aforementioned stories illustrate a phenomenon unique to families
headed by same-sex partners: A family structure consisting of three
parents, in which the couple assumes primary parenting duties, while a
third "parent," often a friend of the opposite sex who may or may not be
biologically related to the child, performs social parenting duties. This
structure is unique in that, unlike heterosexually headed families where a
stepparent may replace or supplement a biological parent based on how the
biological parents' relationship evolves, the three-parent structure in
families headed by same-sex parents is usually planned from birth.
Although certain U.S. jurisdictions have made strides towards
protecting the legal relationships of nonbiological lesbian and gay parents
and their children,' 3 no state has yet adopted a framework that adequately
6.
7.
8.
9.

A.A., 83 O.R.3d at 571.
Id.
Id. at 572.
See, e.g., MAUREEN SULLIVAN,

THE FAMILY OF WOMEN: LESBIAN MOTHERS, THEIR

CHILDREN, AND THE UNDOING OF GENDER

40-62, 190-200 (Regents of the Univ. of Cal.

2004) (describing a variety of relationships lesbian co-parents choose to foster between their
children and the donors).
10. Ginia Bellafante, Surrogate Mothers' New Niche: Bearing Babies for Gay
Couples, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2005, at Al; see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming
Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L.
REV. 227, 228, 261 (2006) (discussing the phenomenon of surrogate mothers working with
gay couples).
11. Bellafante, supra note 10.
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G. 117 P.3d
673 (Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005); In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d
546 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); In re A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); E.N.O. v.
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serves the needs and desires of this unique triad and their offspring.
Historically, the few U.S. jurisdictions that have recognized a third legal
parent have done so in the context of recognizing a second legal father for
the purposes of collecting child support in a heterosexually headed family
where the mother has divorced and remarried. 14 Louisiana has been an
innovator in this area and in at least one case has granted full legal rights to
three parents. 15 More recently, a Pennsylvania court upheld an order
awarding custody rights to three parents in the context of a same-sex
parenting structure. 16 However, none of the aforementioned decisions have
supported the 7concept of separating social parenthood from economic
support duties.'
This Article proposes a theoretical framework for granting legal
recognition to three parents in the context of families headed by same-sex
couples. The framework is limited to a situation where the parents want a
family structure consisting of three parents, with two parents performing
the full panoply of parenting duties and a third parent providing limited
social parenting. While the Canadian family in A.A. v. B.B. wanted all
three parents to have full legal parenting rights, this Article focuses on
families with two parents with full parental rights and a third parent with
limited social rights, because this particular structure is most prevalent
among American same-sex headed families in which three people are
identified as parents.' 8 Social parenthood, as used in this Article, refers to
the concept of defining parenthood on the basis of providing physical,
psychological, intellectual, and spiritual care to children. 19 Traditionally,
social parenthood has been coupled with legal parenthood and its affiliated
economic support obligation; however, this Article explores Professor
Nancy Dowd's argument that, when appropriate, social parenting rights
should be segregated from economic support duties.2 ° I have chosen to
focus on social parenthood for two reasons. First, social parenting is
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 2000); Rubano

v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
14. See, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989); Nebraska v. Mendoza, 481
N.W.2d 165 (Neb. 1992).
15. Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
16. See Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. 2007).

17. See Geen, 666 So. 2d at 1192 (acknowledging the importance of the
nonbiological legal father's social relationship with his son); see also id. at 1197 (holding
that all three legal parents retain their legal and social parental rights, including their
economic support duties to the child); Jacob, 923 A.2d at 482 (ordering a similar outcome).
18. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 40-62. My research on this point has also
been compiled through informal interviews with gay and lesbian families in California and
Oregon.
19. This definition derives from Professor Nancy Dowd's work on social fatherhood.
See, e.g., NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 157 (NYU Press 2000) [hereinafter
DOWD, FATHERHOOD].

20. Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 913 (2006) [hereinafter Dowd, Parentage].
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increasingly recognized by child development experts, scholars, and judges
as a crucial component of children's well-being."a Second, it is reasonable
to believe that for the children of same-sex parents, such social recognition
and protection may be of even greater benefit and importance, due to our
society's ongoing moral debate regarding their parents' lifestyle and
parental fitness.22 Finding ways to legally validate social parenting serves a
critical need of children of same-sex couples.
Although this Article proposes a means of recognizing three parents in
the context of families headed by same-sex couples, the purpose of this
Article is not to endorse or condemn any particular family structure, but
rather to advocate for the needs and desires of a particular family structure
not legally recognized under American law. Many families headed by
same-sex couples regard the notion that their children would need a third
social parent as offensive because it may imply that their parenting is
somehow inherently incomplete since it does not provide role models of
both genders.23 The conclusion that gay or lesbian parenting is inferior is
not supported by social science. 24 Therefore, same-sex couples may opt for
anonymous donors, private adoption, or surrogates who do not have further
contact with their children, believing that from the beginning their family
consists of the two intended parents. 25 On the other hand, many same-sex
couples desire to include a third social parent in their families because they
place importance on their children's ability to have a connection with
people who are biologically related to them or because they want to
provide a role model of the opposite sex. 26 Regardless of the reasoning
21. See Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex

Discriminationand the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J.GENDER & L. 261,
312-13 (2003).
22. Compare James C. Dobson, Two Mommies Is One Too Many, TIME, Dec. 12,
2006, at 123 (arguing that Mary Cheney and her longtime partner, Heather Poe, cannot
provide "complete role models" for their child), with Jennifer Chrisler, Two Mommies or
Two Daddies Will Do Fine, Thanks, TIME, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.time.com/
time/nation/Article/0,8599,1569797,00.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) (arguing that Dobson
misuses science to attack same-sex parenting). See also A.A. v. B.B., 83 O.R.3d 561 (2007)
(discussing why the legal recognition of nonbiological lesbian moms is in the best interests
of their children).
23. See Dobson, supra note 22 (for an example of the argument that same-sex
families are incomplete because they don't provide role models of both genders). But see
Nancy D. Polikoff, The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is It An
Option for Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375, 375, 377

(1996) (reasoning that "it is no tragedy, either on a national scale or in an individual family,
for children to be raised without fathers," and that "[t]he choice to raise a child without a
father is a legitimate choice and the family thereby created is a legitimate family.").
24. See, e.g., Ruth Ullmann Paige, Proceedings of the American Psychological
Associationfor the Legislative Year 2004: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of
Representatives, 60

AMERICAN

PSYCHOLOGIST

436,

496

(2005),

available

at

http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/policy/parents.html.
25. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 53-54.
26. See id. at 47-52. See also June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood:
Uncertaintyat the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1336 (2005) ("[W]hen the
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behind family structures, the overarching principle behind this research is
to find further legal means of supporting families in whatever form their
members have chosen to create them.
Part II of this Article discusses why existing legal frameworks are
inadequate to address the needs of three-parent families headed by samesex couples. Part II begins with a discussion of California's recent case of
Elisa B. v. Superior Court, which applies the Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) provisions on paternity to a nonbiological mother in order to allow
recognition of two legal parents of the same gender, in the absence of a
legal adoption or a same-sex civil union.2 7 This Article focuses on this case
because it provides a unique and relevant illustration of how the UPA can
be used to recognize same-sex parents when it is applied in a genderneutral fashion.
Part III argues that the California Supreme Court's application of the
UPA should serve as a guideline for interpreting the UPA. After outlining
Professor Nancy Dowd's social fatherhood proposal,2 8 this section looks to
California precedent as a guideline for applying Professor Dowd's proposal
in a gender-neutral manner that allows recognition of a third social parent
of either gender. It also addresses why this particular solution is most ideal
for achieving legal protections for the family structure I have described.
Finally, Part III applies the proposed changes to the family forms discussed
in this introduction - families headed by a lesbian couple and families
headed by a gay male couple - and discusses potential shortcomings. It
concludes by highlighting some of the issues this Article raises and
suggesting directions for future scholarship.
For families this Article addresses, the preferred first step will likely be
establishing the rights of the primary parents - the same-sex couples. A
complete discussion of the legal status of second-parent adoption, gay
marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnership laws in the United States
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, these methods represent the
preferred means of ensuring parentage, where they are available, and a
brief discussion of them is appropriate.
Second-parent adoptions may provide the greatest level of protection
for same-sex parents because these adoptions are entitled to full faith and
credit from other states.2 9 Such adoptions are also the most commonly
recognized method for achieving legal recognition of a second
nonbiological parent of the same gender.
Roughly half of U.S.
child is unlikely to develop an emotional bond with the biological parent, knowledge of
genetic heritage is likely to play a role in shaping identity.").
27. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 664, 667-70 (Cal. 2005).
28. See Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 913.
29. Deborah L. Forman, Same-Sex Partners: Strangers, Third Parties, or Parents?,
40 FAM. L.Q. 23, 44 (2006); see also Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56 (Neb. 2002)
(holding that Nebraska must recognize a second-parent adoption performed in Pennsylvania,
even though such an adoption would not have been permitted under Nebraska law).
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jurisdictions permit such adoptions. 30 These adoptions usually entail using
a state's independent adoption statutes to petition for adoption of the child
by the biological parent's partner, while retaining the biological parent's
parental rights. 31 The availability and means of obtaining second-parent
adoptions vary by state.
Another means of achieving parenting rights is through some kind of
legally recognized commitment of the same-sex partners.32
The
legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts provides one simple
means of ensuring parental rights for some individuals who are married to
the biological parents. Under Massachusetts law, same-sex partners have
full parental status simply by marrying prior to conceiving a child.33 States
that have stopped short of granting same-sex couples the right to marry
may grant some marital rights through other means. For example, Vermont
achieves recognition of same-sex partners as parents through its civil union
laws.34 California law recognizes such rights through its domestic
partnership statutes.35
An additional method for recognizing same-sex co-parents is through
the use of the court's equitable powers to recognize a psychological parent
or a de facto parent. 36 This method has several downsides. The tests for
qualifying as a psychological parent or a de facto parent vary by state, and
some believe that treating these types of parents as legally equivalent to a
traditional parent raises constitutional issues.37 Furthermore, establishing
the requirements of these doctrines generally requires the lapse of a
significant time period, making them ill-suited for determining parentage at
birth.3 8
In states that have adopted some version of the UPA, this Act may be
used as another means of recognizing a second parent of the same gender.
For example, in Elisa B., the Court applied the UPA provision on presumed
30. Forman, supra note 29, at 43.
31. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554, 559-63 (Cal. 2003).
32. As mentioned above, while marriage or civil unions may ensure legal parentage
for nonbiological parents in the states that recognize them, second-parent adoption is still
necessary to ensure recognition of legal parentage outside of one's home state.
33. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding
that denying same-sex couples the benefits and protections of marriage was
unconstitutional). It should be noted that the Massachusetts House of Representatives voted
to advance a constitutional amendment to define marriage as between a man and a woman
earlier this year. If the amendment passes another vote later this year, it will be placed on
the 2008 ballot as a referendum question. See H.R. 4617, 184th Sess. (Mass. 2007),
available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/184history/h04617.htm; Pam Belluck, Same-Sex
Marriage Setback in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at A12, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/03/us/03gay.html.
34. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(t) (2002).
35. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2005).

36. See Forman, supra note 29, at 32-35.
37. See id.

38. See id. for further discussion of these methods.
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paternity to a nonbiological mother in order to allow recognition of two
legal parents of the same gender, in the absence of a legal adoption or a
registered domestic partnership. 39 This provision, as quoted in Elisa B.,
states that "a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if '[h]e
receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child."' 40 Emily and Elisa were in a committed lesbian relationship
during which each gave birth to children through the use of artificial
insemination and parented the children together.4 1 Elisa supported Emily's
biological children, even after the couple's separation.42 When she ceased
support, the issue of whether she was required to support the children as
their second mother came before the California Supreme Court.43 The
Court applied the provision on presumed paternity to Elisa and found that
she was the children's mother because she had received the children into
her home and held them out as her own.44 One limitation of the Court's
application of the UPA in Elisa B. is that it does not allow the second
parent to be recognized at birth or shortly thereafter because, to
convincingly show that an adult has accepted a child into his or her home
and held out the child as his or her own, the passage of some period of time
is required.4 5
The 2002 UPA also contains an article dealing with assisted
reproduction,4 6 under which lesbian women whose partners use assisted
reproductive technologies should be legally recognized as parents. Section
106 of the 2002 UPA, allows courts to use any paternity section of the UPA
to establish maternity.47 Section 703 of the 2002 UPA establishes paternity
in some cases of assisted reproduction births.4 8 It reads: "A man who
provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as
provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a
parent of the resulting child., 49 Section 704 requires that a man and a
woman who intend to be the parents of a child born by assisted
reproduction sign a record authenticating their consent.50 If the man does
not consent in an authenticated record, he may still be found to be the
39. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 667-70 (Cal. 2005).
40. Id. at 667 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (d) (West. 2005)).

41. Id. at 663.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 664.
44. Id. at 667-70. For a more in-depth discussion of this case, see infra Part I11A.
45. The 1973 version of the UPA did not specify a time period for establishing a
presumption of paternity, but the 2002 UPA requirement is two years. UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 204 cmt. (amended 2002).
46. Id. at art. 7.
47. "Provisions of this [Act] relating to determination of paternity apply to
determinations of maternity." Id. § 106.
48. Id. § 703.
49. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703. (amended 2002).
50. Id. § 704(a).
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parent of the child if during the first two years of the child's life if he
resides with the child and mother and openly holds the child out as his
own. 5' For the purposes of establishing a second nonbiological mother, the
parts of these sections that refer to a man's actions apply equally to a
woman. Unfortunately, this gender neutrality breaks down in the context
of gestational agreements that may be used by gay male couples. Section
801 currently reads:
(a) A prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is
married, a donor or the donors, and the intended parents may
enter into a written agreement providing that:
(1) The prospective gestational mother agrees to pregnancy by
means of assisted reproduction;
(2) The prospective gestational mother, her husband if she is
married, and the donors relinquish all rights and duties as
the parents of a child conceived through assisted
reproduction; and
(3) The intended parents become the parents of the child.
(b) The man and the woman who are the intended parents must
both be parties to the gestational agreement.
(c) A gestational agreement is enforceable only if validated as
provided in Section 803.
(d) A gestational agreement does not apply to the birth of a child
conceived by means of sexual intercourse.
(e) A gestational agreement may provide for payment of
consideration.
(f) A gestational agreement may not limit the right of the
gestational mother to make decisions to safeguard her health or
that of the embryos or fetus.
The use of the phrase "[t]he man and the woman who are the intended
parents" in subsection 801(b) of this provision prevents the UPA from
recognizing gestational agreements between gay male couples and a
surrogate. Ideally, the UPA at some point will explicitly address the reality
of same-sex parenting but, until it does, simply removing the reference to
the man and woman in this provision would be an excellent way to gain
further recognition of same-sex parents. Exploring this option in greater
detail is beyond the scope of this Article but presents an exciting prospect
for future scholarship.

51. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704(b). (amended 2002).

52. Id. § 801.
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II. EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR RECOGNIZING
THREE LEGAL PARENTS
A. CASE LAW
1.

Heterosexually Headed Families

Dual paternity has been recognized in Louisiana for the purpose of
collecting child support5 3 as well as for assigning custodial rights.54 The
origins of dual paternity stem from a 1974 case allowing a non-marital
child to recover for her biological father's wrongful death even though she
was also the legal child of another man. 55 Until recently, Louisiana statutes
did not provide a means for a biological father to recognize his child where
the child already had a legal father, but the judicially created avowal action
56
allowed for this recognition and created the potential for dual paternity.
For example, in Smith v. Cole, a husband and wife had separated but not
yet divorced when the wife conceived a child with another man.57 The
husband did not disavow paternity and therefore, as the presumptive father,
he became the child's legal father.5 8 The husband and wife subsequently
divorced and when the wife's relationship with the biological father of the
child dissolved, she sued the biological father for child support. 59 The trial
court found that a mother could not bastardize her child to obtain a support
order and dismissed her petition. The mother appealed, and the appellate
court found that the mother's petition stated a cause of action because even
though the child's legal father was required to support the child, the child's
biological father was also obligated to provide support.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed and held that under
Louisiana law a husband may be the legal father while the biological
father's actual paternity could also be legally established for the purpose of
collecting child support. 60 The Court reviewed legislative amendments to
the marital presumption and found a trend toward limiting the power of the
presumption when it did not conform to reality. 6 1 The Court also
summarized indirect attacks on the presumption from three distinct groups:

53. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989).
54. See Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1195-97 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
55. See Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813 (La. 1974). See also Smith, 553 So. 2d at
850-51 (discussing the Louisiana jurisprudential trend towards recognizing dual paternity).
56. See Mouret v. Godeaux, 886 So. 2d 1217, 1221-22 (La. Ct. App. 2004)
(discussing the history of avowal actions and dual paternity in Louisiana and the recent
enactment of Louisiana Civil Code Article 191, which codifies a biological father's right to
assert his paternity where the paternity of the child's legal father has not been rebutted).
57. Smith, 553 So. 2d at 848.
58. Id. at 849, 854.
59. Id. at 848.
60. Id. at 854-55.
61. Id. at 850-51.
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children, the state, and biological fathers.62 The Court found that each of
these groups had succeeded in further limiting the presumption.63 The
Court also noted that the legal tie of paternity and legitimacy was not
affected by subsequently identifying the child's biological father.64 Finally,
the Court observed that if the marital presumption did not preclude a
biological father from avowing his paternity, that is, if it did not prevent
him from asserting his rights, then the same presumption should not protect
him from the economic responsibilities of parenthood.65
The result in this case was the legal recognition of two fathers, albeit
for distinct purposes. The legal father's status was maintained to preserve
the child's legitimacy, thereby serving one of the underlying purposes of
the marital presumption; the biological father's paternity was legally
recognized so that the child, like other children under the state's law, would
be entitled to financial support from both biological parents. Subsequent
decisions of the Louisiana courts have upheld this outcome.6 6
Smith shows that it is possible to unbundle parental rights and that the
legal recognition of parental rights does not necessarily mandate providing
equal decision-making rights to all those parents who are recognized.6 7
However, the Court's analysis is limited to serving the goals of legitimacy
and enforcing support obligations, and says nothing about the social needs
of the child.
Nebraska has also supported the idea of dual paternity for the purposes
of collecting child support. In Nebraska v. Mendoza, a child was born
outside of wedlock, and Mendoza, the biological father, had initially taken
actions that displayed an acknowledgment of paternity. 68 The mother
subsequently married another man, Castillo, who supported the child and
signed a notarized document acknowledging himself as the child's father
for the purpose of changing the child's birth certificate.69 Mendoza then
argued that Castillo's signing of the birth certificate relieved him of
paternity for the purposes of child support. The court made three important
findings: (1) obligating Mendoza to support the child would not alter

62. Smith, 553 So. 2d at 850.
63. See id. at 850-51.
64. Id. at 854.

65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Yolanda F.B. v. Robert DR., 775 So. 2d 1107 (La. Ct. App. 2000)
(allowing mother to file petition to establish paternity where another man had previously
been judicially recognized as the legal father). However, in a 1995 case, the Louisiana
Court of Appeal acknowledged that "the rights and obligations which evolve from the legal
fiction of dual paternity are not well defined." Smith v. Dison, 662 So. 2d 90, 94 (La. Ct.
App. 1995).
The Court also mused that "perhaps the whole concept should be
reconsidered." Id.
67. See Carbone, supra note 26, at 1341-42 (discussing the implications of Smith for
separating parental responsibilities and rights).
68. Nebraska v. Mendoza, 481 N.W.2d 165, 167-68 (Neb. 1992).
69. Id. at 168.
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Castillo's rights; 70 (2) the signing of a sworn acknowledgment of paternity
filed for the purposes of obtaining a new birth certificate did not
conclusively establish the party executing it as the child's legal father,
precluding the recognition of other fathers; 7' and (3) paternity by estoppel
did not apply because the person who had made misrepresentations as to
paternity, Castillo, was not a party to the case. Although the Court stops
short of actually declaring two legal fathers, by finding that Castillo's
acknowledgement of paternity for the purposes of altering the child's birth
certificate did not conclusively establish him as the legal parent,7 3 it cites
Smith approvingly.74
The Louisiana appellate court case of Geen v. Geen is much closer to
the mark as an ideal example of a court recognizing multiple parenthood, at
least for heterosexual parents. Here, the Court legally recognized both a
biological and a social father and preserved the social father's primary role
in the child's life, despite his lack of biological connection. 75 The mother
was pregnant when she married Geen, and previously had sexual relations
with Robertson, who knew of the pregnancy but was not told whether he
was the father.76 The mother and Geen separated a year after the child's
birth; the Court awarded joint legal custody, but granted Geen primary
physical custody.77 The mother then resumed her relationship with
Robertson and the two subsequently married.78 When DNA testing
revealed that Robertson was the child's biological father, he sought to
establish legal custody as well as primary physical custody of the child.79
The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's ruling which
only granted physical custody to the child's mother and Robertson, and
instead granted joint custody to the three parents.80 The Court held that it
was in the child's best interest to remain in Geen's physical custody
because "[e]verything introduced into the record shows that Geen is a
model parent. He has been the one constant, stable factor in this child's life the primary caretaker from the moment of birth, and in whose care Ryan
[the child] has flourished.", 8' The Court added that as between Geen and
Robertson, "Geen is favored .... Geen has been faithfully fulfilling the

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
this point.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Mendoza, 481 N.W.2d at 169.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 171-72. A subsequent Nebraska case reaffirmed the Court's position on
See Nebraska v. Batt, 573 N.W.2d 425, 434 (Neb. 1998).
Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1197 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
Id.
Id. at 1193-94.
Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1194.
Id.
Idat 1197.
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role of father for a much longer time .... ,,82
Before evaluating whether the law applied in Geen can serve the needs
of the family structures this Article addresses, a threshold question must be
analyzed: Is Geen still good law after the Supreme Court's decision in
Troxel v. Granville?83 In Troxel, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
Washington Supreme Court's holding that Washington's third-party
visitation statute unconstitutionally violated parents' substantive due
process right to rear their children free from state intervention. 84 Tommie
Granville and Brad Troxel, a mother and father, had two daughters together
and subsequently separated.85 After the separation, Brad resided with his
parents, and his daughters often visited him and their grandparents on
weekends. 86 Several years later, Brad committed suicide and shortly
thereafter, Tommie Granville sought to limit the grandparents' visitation to
grandparents commenced suit under
The
one visit per month.
88
Washington's visitation statute.
Washington's visitation statute allowed any party to petition the court
for visitation rights at any time. 89 Although the U.S. Supreme Court issued
no majority opinion, the plurality opinion of Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Ginsberg, and Breyer asserted that the Washington statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Tommie Granville because the trial court had
ignored the presumption that fit parents act in their child's best interests. 90
The trial court had assumed that grandparent visitation was in the child's
82. Geen, 666 So. 2d at 1196.
83. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
84. Id. at 60, 63. This liberty interest was first recognized by the Court in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), where the Court recognized parents' rights to control the
education of their children. That precedent was followed closely by the Court's decision in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which the Court affirmed parents'
liberty interests in determining education choices for their children. The right to parental
care, custody, and control was further explored further in the well known opinions of Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Prince elucidates the limits of parental power. In Prince a custodial aunt allowed her minor
niece to attempt to sell religious material in violation of a state statute prohibiting child
labor. 321 U.S. at 160-63. When it reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the case turned on
whether the statutes prohibiting child labor were an unconstitutional infringement on
parents' liberty interest in controlling their children's upbringing. Id. at 163. The Court
found that "neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation," and
that when the practice of either exposes the child to serious danger or harm it could be
limited by the state. Id. at 166-67. Interestingly, Yoder went in the opposite direction.
There the Court found that Amish parents did have the right to remove their children from
the public education system after eighth grade due to their religious beliefs. Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 232. The Court, somewhat unconvincingly, distinguished Prince based on the child labor
issue and on the level of threat to the child and to public safety and order. Id. at 229-30.
85. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 60-61.
88. Id. at 61.
89. Id. at 67.
90. Id. at 68-70.
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best interests, placing the burden on the fit parent to challenge that
assumption. 91 The plurality held that the opposite assumption should have
applied - that a fit parent is acting in the best interest of her child in
denying visitation - in the absence of a showing by the challenger that
such decision is detrimental to the child.92 These Justices believed "special
weight" should be given to a fit parent's determination regarding visitation,
but they did not precisely define this standard.93 The plurality also
mentioned that Tommie Granville did not totally eliminate her children's
visitation with their grandparents and that this fact, along with other issues
implicated by the trial court's misapplication of the law, resulted in the trial
court's visitation order being unconstitutional.9 4 The Court's holding in
Troxel has been criticized as unclear with regard to its application to states'
visitation statutes because of its failure to issue a binding opinion and the
plurality's reliance on a combination of factors. 95
Arguably, Troxel does not address the situation where the third-party
seeking custody is the undisputed biological father of a child who already
has a legal father. However, under Troxel, both the biological father and
the nonbiological legal father in Geen could have argued to exclude each
other. Geen, the nonbiological legal father, could have argued that as a fit
legal parent, special weight should have been given to his desire to
continue to be the custodial parent to his child, absent a showing of
detriment to the child. Robertson could have argued that Geen, as a
nonbiological parent, had the burden to show that severing his relationship
with the child, Ryan, would have been detrimental to the child. Ultimately,
if Troxel's heightened standard for deference to the preferences of parents
were applied against Geen, it is likely Geen would have been able to prove
detriment to Ryan had their relationship and the physical custody
arrangement been altered. As will be discussed in further detail in the
conclusion of this Article, it is less clear whether granting full parenting
rights to three parents is constitutional.
Assuming the law applied in Geen is constitutional under Troxel, it is
still inadequate to meet the needs of same-sex families who wish to form a
three-parent family structure for several reasons. First, there is nothing in
the opinion to support the idea that the court would have reached the same
conclusion had all three parents cooperatively attempted to create a family
headed by three parents at the birth of the child. At the time of the court
proceeding, Geen had long been established as the legal father and had

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
See id.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 72.
See, e.g., Susan Tomaine, Comment,

Troxel v.

Granville: Protecting

Fundamental Parental Rights While Recognizing Changes in the American Family, 50
CATH. U. L. REV. 731, 733, 765 (2001).

184

HAST1NGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:2

established a significant bond with the child. Altering this relationship
would not have been in the child's best interests and in fact may have been
detrimental to the child. However, if the Court had held that Robertson had
failed to assert his parental rights for a significant period of time and was
therefore barred from asserting them, it would have set a burdensome
precedent for biological fathers. Furthermore, not recognizing both fathers
would have created a situation that either significantly limited the
biological father's rights or did not protect the best interests of the child.
Although the Court's recognition of three legal parents is unusual, the
Court's focus is on preserving the status quo for the child in question,
rather than altering the legal relationships and custody arrangements that
already exist.
Second, it is entirely uncertain whether such a family structure would
have been supported by the Court if the family had been headed by a samesex couple. The concept of dual paternity has not been addressed by the
Louisiana courts in the context of any same-sex parenting structure.
Furthermore, Louisiana cannot be characterized as a state that is friendly to
same-sex parenting. As recently as the mid-1990s, in the case of Scott v.
Scott, the Louisiana appellate court removed two children from the custody
of their mother because she was in an openly lesbian relationship, in
violation of a joint-custody agreement, although she was otherwise fit. 96 In
2004, Louisiana enacted a law banning same-sex marriage and civil unions
that was subsequently upheld by its courts. 9 The state also has no recorded
state adoptions by same-sex couples, but there is evidence98that gays and
lesbians may be serving as foster parents in the state system.
Third, the dual paternity law of Louisiana, as evidenced by both Cole
and Geen, has thus far been limited to situations where the legal father and
mother have divorced and a biological father has either come forward to
establish rights or has been obligated to support his child financially. There
may often be good reason, in the context of marriage, to limit the
application of dual paternity. As Professor Mary Louise Fellows writes,
"[d]ual paternity would increase the risk of forced fatherhood outside of
marriage and decrease the control of fatherhood inside of marriage ....
Both of these consequences have little to do with children's welfare." 99
However, under the fact pattern this Article seeks to address, the risks of
forcing parental relationships or decreasing parental control are moot, or at
least minimal because the parties themselves seek to share control in order
96. Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
97. Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So. 2d 715 (La. 2005).
98. JOANNE SMITH, NAT'L RES. CTR. FOR FOSTER CARE & PERMANENCY PLANNING,
INFORMATION PACKET: GAY & LESBIAN FOSTER CARE AND ADOPTION 12 (2002), available

at http://www.hunter.cuny.edu/socwork/nrcfcpp/downloads/information-packets/gayand-lesbian-fc-and-adopt-pkt.pdf.
99. Mary Louise Fellows, A Feminist Interpretationof the Law of Legitimacy, 7 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 195, 204 (1998).
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to create a preferred parenting structure. Geen is instructive on this point to
the extent that one reason the Court may have been more willing to allow
recognition of both legal fathers was not only because of the divorce of the
legal parents but also because the legal 0 father
supported his son's
0
relationship with the boy's biological parents.1
Finally, the Geen Court did not address the concept of unbundling
parental rights to allow for social parenthood. Theoretically, if the court
were willing to allow recognition of three legal parents, the court might
consider giving lesser rights to a third parent in the right situation.
However, so far the Louisiana courts have only allowed financial
responsibilities to be unbundled from full legal parentage.' 0 ' In Smith, the
Louisiana Supreme Court declined to express an opinion regarding whether
legal fathers would always be obligated to share support obligations with
the biological mother and father, but in dicta the Court 02noted that the best
interests of the child would guide such a determination.'
It is also important to note that while Louisiana, in the context of
heterosexually headed families, has made great strides towards allowing
multiple parents, many other states have gone in the opposite direction.
For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has rejected dual
paternity. In Bodwell v. Brooks, a husband and wife were separated when
the wife became pregnant with another man's child. 0 3 They subsequently
divorced but reconciled and remarried less than a year later. 0 4 The
biological father filed for both legal custody and physical custody. 10 5 The
husband and wife contested the custody motions but did not contest the
child's biological paternity. 10 6 The Superior Court found that the husband
lacked any standing to assert legal rights to the child because his paternity
was rebutted as a matter of law once the biological father's paternity had
been proven. 10 7 The New Hampshire Supreme Court declined to follow the
husband's request that the Court adopt a form of dual paternity and allow
the putative biological father to establish a filial relationship with the child
while not disturbing the presumed father's legal relationship with the
child. 10 8 The Court based its decision on the United States Supreme Court
case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., in which the Court held that "the claim
that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in the
history or traditions of this country."' 0 9 However, the Court found that the
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1195 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
See, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854-55 (La. 1989).
Id. at 855 n.8.
Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179, 1181 (N.H. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1182.
Id. at 1182 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989)).
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husband could assert legal rights to the child because he had acted in loco
parentis, and it remanded the case for a determination of custody based on
the child's best interests. 110
Several other states have specifically addressed and rejected the
concept of dual paternity or maternity."ll Also, many states allow a child to
be denied even two parents, where
paternity testing proves a father is not
1 12
child.
a
to
related
biologically

110. Bodwell, 686 A.2d at 1183-84.
111. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert,'851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a
child can only have one natural mother under California law); In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 29
(Cal. 2004) (recognizing two presumed fathers but concluding that paternity must ultimately
be granted to one under California law); GDK v. State, 92 P.3d 834, 839-40 (Wyo. 2004)
(noting that there is no authority for recognizing dual paternity under Wyoming law). It
should be noted that California has rejected the notion of dual paternity or maternity where
it would result in three parents, but has recognized that a child can have two legal mothers in
the context of same-sex headed families. See Elisa B. v. Sup. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal.
2005); K.M. v. E.G. 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal.
2005).
112. See State ex rel. A.T. v. E.W., 695 So. 2d 624, 625-26 (Ala. 1997) (allowing
adjudicated father to reopen paternity case based on Alabama Code section 26-17A-1,
which permits reopening of paternity cases based on DNA evidence, even though father had
previously decided to forgo DNA testing and had not appealed the denial of his first request
to reopen paternity proceedings); In re Marriage of Adams, 701 N.E.2d 1131, 1133-34 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998) (permitting legal father to disestablish paternity when evidence revealed his
child had been conceived through an extramarital affair rather than through artificial
insemination and finding no authority to consider the child's best interests when terminating
the ten-year parent-child relationship); In re Marriage of Bethards, 526 N.W.2d 871, 875
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (finding that genetic testing establishing father's lack of paternity was
a sufficient change in circumstances to allow termination of his support duties); Walter v.
Gunter, 788 A.2d 609, 610-11 (Md. 2002) (ruling putative father not liable for child support
arrears after paternity judgment was vacated); K.B. v. D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725, 728-30 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994) (finding husband not estopped from raising defense of nonpaternity even
though court considered detriment to 7-year-old with whom he had a father-child
relationship); Williams v. Williams, 843 So. 2d 720, 723 (Miss. 2003) (reversing lower
court ruling denying former husband's motion to modify divorce decree to reflect his lack of
paternity because a "manifest injustice [would] result if [he] is required to continue making
child support payments for a child which unquestionably is not his" (quoting M.A.S. v.
Miss. Dep't of Human Serv., 842 So. 2d 527, 531 (Miss. 2003)); M.A.S., 842 So. 2d at 528
(directing lower court to grant acknowledged father's motion for relief from child support
and paternity order after ten years where DNA test proved he was not the father because it
was "profoundly unjust" to require him to continue support); State ex rel. Div. of Child
Support Enforcement v. Hill, 53 S.W.3d 137, 138-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
adjudicated father could bring motion for relief from paternity judgment after the five-year
statute of limitations had passed where "fraud on the court" had occurred); Dep't of Human
Serv. v. Chisum, 85 P.3d 860, 862-63 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) (holding that putative father
could not be equitably estopped from disestablishing paternity); Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d
1279, 1284-85 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that former husband was not estopped from
disestablishing paternity despite ten-year father-child relationship).
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Same-Sex Headed Families

In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld a
custody order granting shared physical custody of a lesbian couple's two
children to the three parents involved in their lives: their biological mother
(Mom No. 1), their nonbiological mother (Mom No. 2), and their biological
father, a sperm donor who had acted as a third social parent to the children
at the request of the mothers. 1 3 This opinion might be seen as a great
stride toward recognition of three-parent families, but for some of the
Court's problematic findings and holdings.
In Jacob, the two mothers had a total of four children but only two
were the biological children of Mom No. 1 and the parties' sperm donor, a
long-time friend of Mom No. 2.114 The other two children were Mom No.
I's nephews, whom she had adopted.' 5 Mom No. 2 appealed the custody
order to the extent that it gave Mom No. 1 primary physical custody of
three of the parties' children, including Mom No. l's two biological
children." 6 Mom No. 2 also appealed the trial court's refusal to join the
biological father in the support hearing on the grounds that his award of
partial physical custody also conferred a corresponding economic support
responsibility. 117
The Superior Court upheld the custody order because although the
lower court had properly recognized Mom No. 2's in loco parentis status,
as between a de facto parent and a biological parent, the scale was still
tipped heavily in favor of the biological parent and Mom No. 2's
evidentiary proof had not overcome this burden.1 8 Additionally, the Court
held that principles of fundamental fairness required the biological father of
the children to contribute to their economic support. 1 9 The Court found
that if Mom No. 2, a "third party," was obligated to pay support by virtue
of her de facto parent status, then the same should be true of the children's
biological father, who was also required to provide support by statute for
his minor children.' 2 0 The Court also relied on the biological father's past
financial contributions and social
parenting of the children to support an
2'
obligation.'
support
economic
While the Superior Court's opinion supports continued social parenting
by all three parents, the opinion also has troubling precedential value. The
opinion allows courts to continue to give biological parents the upper hand
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 476, 482 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Id. at 476.
Id.
Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 476,479.
Id. at 477-78.
Id. at480.
Id.
Id. at481.
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in custody disputes, even in the context of same-sex families where both
the biological and nonbiological parent have been the child's intended
parents since birth. Additionally, the opinion raises the vital and
disconcerting question: At what point does a sperm donor become a parent
who is obligated to provide economic support? Does it happen if he gives
the intended parents money for the children? What if he remains in the
children's lives, buying them presents and seeing them on occasion? The
opinion also highlights why separating social parenthood from economic
parenthood is crucial, especially in the context of same-sex couples in
which sperm donation coupled with a social parenting role may be
discouraged by attaching a support obligation. Such a support obligation is
arguably less critical when two parents are already obligated to support
their children.
As discussed above, a minor trend towards recognizing multiple
parenthood exists under American case law, and has even been extended to
same-sex families. However, the law on this point does not separate social
parenthood from economic obligation and may therefore actually
discourage social parenthood.
B.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION

The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution (ALI Principles) provide for the recognition of multiple
parents. 112 Section 2.03 of the ALI Principles identifies three types of
parents: a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, and a de facto parent. 23 Under
the ALI Principles, a "legal parent" is someone who would currently be
identified as a parent under state law. 124 A "parent by estoppel" has lived
with the child and assumed full parental duties on a permanent basis with
the acquiescence of the child's legal parents but is not otherwise recognized
under existing law. 125 A "de facto parent" lived with the child and
provided nurturance and care on an equal level with the child's legal
parents, either with the legal parent's consent or in response to their failure
to parent. 26 Under the ALI Principles, parents by estoppel are treated the
same as traditional parents. 127 De facto parents' status affords them limited
legal rights. If they are in a custody dispute with legal parents and parents

122. See generally ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2000) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES]. See also David D. Meyer,

Partners, Care Givers, and the ConstitutionalSubstance of Parenthood,in RECONCEIVING
THE FAMILY 47, 47 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (discussing the ALI's approach to
child custody disputes).
123. Meyer, supra note 122, at 50-51 (citing ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.03(1)).
124. Id. at 51 (citing ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.03(1)(a)).
125. Id. (citing ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.03(1)(b)).
126. Id. (citing ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.03(l)(c)).
127. Id. (citing ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.08(l)(a)).
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by estoppel, they cannot be assigned the majority of caretaking duties,
unless an exception applies. 2 8 Any number of these three types of parents
may be recognized as legal parents under the ALl Principles to the extent
that this is practical and maintains the status quo for the child. 2 9 The ALl
Principles set no numerical limit on the number of parents that can be
legally recognized, but they do state that significant decision-making for
the child should not be shared by more than two parents. 130
Although the ALl Principles provide the most explicit endorsement of
multiple parenthood, they also have severe limitations. First, and most
importantly, the ALl Principles' description of who may be recognized as a
parent likely excludes most social parents in same-sex families. A parent
by estoppel must assume full parental duties in order to be recognized,
which excludes a social parent who is only performing limited parenting
duties. The social parent is also likely excluded from being recognized as a
de facto parent because de facto parenthood also requires that they parent
on an equal level with the child's legal parents and live with the child.' A
social parent in a same-sex family is unlikely to cohabitate with the
child, 1 32 and is generally not performing an equal share of parenting duties.
For example, if a lesbian couple decides to use a known donor, the couple
will likely either select a relative of the non-birth mother or a friend of the
couple. In Maureen Sullivan's book on lesbian parenting, she describes
one such parenting arrangement: Natalie and Kim found a known donor,
Mark, through a mutual friend, and using his sperm, they had a daughter,
Nikki. 133 Natalie and Kim lived in northern California while Mark and his
partner resided in L.A. 134 Mark visited with Nikki once a month or so, was
known to the child as her father, and was involved in some of the decisions
regarding Nikki's welfare and future. 135 Applying the ALl Principles to
this family means that if Mark has relinquished all of his legal rights as a
parent, he cannot qualify as either a parent by estoppel or a de facto parent
because he has a limited social function as a parent and does not reside
with Nikki.
As the above example illustrates, in order to preserve their
relationships with children, social parents must look to other mechanisms
128. Meyer, supra note 122, at 51 (citing ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note

122, §

2.18(l)(a)). Exceptions would include cases where the child's other parents failed to
adequately perform a reasonable amount of parenting duties or when granting the primary
role to another parent would harm the child. See id. (citing ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 122,
§ 2.18(1)(a)(i)-(ii)).
129. Meyer, supra note 122, at 51 (citing ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.18(1)(b)).
130. Id. (citing ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.09(1)).
131. See AL PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.03(l)(c).

132. See SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 190-200 (discussing a variety of donor-extended
kinship arrangements which do not involve cohabitation).
133. Id. at 198.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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under the ALI Principles. The ALI Principles do state that "a biological
parent who is not a legal parent but who has an agreement with a legal
parent under which he or she reserved some parental rights or
responsibilities" may initiate or intervene in a custody action. 3 6 Custody
determinations may take into account prior agreements "that would be
appropriate to consider in light of the circumstances as a whole, including
the reasonable expectations of the parties, the extent to which they could
have reasonably anticipated the events that occurred and their significance,
and the interests of the child," but they are not required to enforce such
agreements. 37 A court may also allocate parenting responsibilities to a
biological parent who has an agreement preserving some parenting rights,
at the court's discretion. 138 Using the example of Natalie, Kim, and Mark,
if the three parents sign a legal agreement whereby Mark relinquishes all
parental rights, except his right to maintain a social relationship and have
visitation with their child, Mark, as a biological non-legal parent, would
have the right to participate in any custody action at the dissolution of
Natalie and Kim's relationship. The court may or may not consider
preserving the agreement with Mark, if it is in the child's best interests.
Even if the court does consider the agreement, the extent to which the
agreement is preserved may also depend on whether the court believes the
parents intended it to apply in the event of a family dissolution. It seems
likely that in the often acrimonious nature of family dissolution, one or
both of the legal parents may contest Mark's rights. Furthermore, Mark
only has a right to participate in the custody action if there is evidence of an
agreement between him and the child's legal parents whereby Mark retains
some of his parental rights. If the parties did not properly document such
an agreement, Mark may have no rights or alternatively, he may have more
legal rights, as a biological parent, than Natalie and Kim intended him to
have. This situation would play out in the same fashion if a gay male
couple created the same type of agreement with a surrogate who is also the
biological mother of their child.
To summarize, the ALl Principles present several hurdles for biological
social parents. First, they have to create an agreement that clearly
articulates the rights they retain to their child. Second, they have to
affirmatively intervene in the custody action. Finally, they have to
convince the judge to preserve their rights, or some portion of them. This
last hurdle may be the most daunting, and it creates an uncertainty that may
discourage many people from wanting to take on the role of a social parent.
The limitations of the ALl Principles become clearer if we consider
what happens in the event that Natalie and Kim or Bill and Steve have

136. AlI PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.04(1)(d).
137. Id. §§ 2.08(1)(e), 2.18 & illus. c.
138. Id. §§ 2.09(I)(e), 2.18(2)(b) & illus. c.
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formed an agreement with a third social parent who is not biologically
related to their child. The ALl Principles enable a court to allow other
parties to intervene in custody actions in exceptional circumstances and
where their participation may serve in the child's best interests. 39 This
leaves much discretion to a court that may or may not be familiar or
amenable to the parental structure these families have created. Therefore,
nonbiological social parents must first convince a judge to let them
intervene, and then convince a judge to preserve their rights.
The previous discussion illuminates the second limitation of the ALI
They are used primarily in the context of divorce and
Principles.
dissolution of relationships, as their title suggests. Therefore, the ALl
Principles do not provide a means of achieving recognition of multiple
parents at birth, and their focus is on preserving relationships rather than
creating them. 40 A third limitation is that no state has formally adopted the
ALI Principles. 141
III. ACHIEVING LEGAL RECOGNITION FOR SAME-SEX
HEADED FAMILIES WITH A THIRD SOCIAL PARENT
A. ELISA B: A MODEL OF GENDER-NEUTRAL APPLICATION OF THE UPA
California has recently found a new means of recognizing same-sex
parents. In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held
that, under California's version of the 1973 UPA, a child's legal parents
could both be of the same gender even in the absence of a formal adoption
proceeding or a domestic partnership. 142 Emily and Elisa were living
together in a committed lesbian relationship when the two decided to start a
family. 143 Elisa gave birth to a son in November of 1998, and in March of
1998 Emily gave birth to twins.144 The twins were premature and the male
45
twin had significant medical problems, including Down's syndrome.
139. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, §§ 2.08(1)(e), 2.18 illus. c.
140. See Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 917.

141. Meyer, supra note 122, at 51-52 n.28 (noting that one state, West Virginia, has
adopted the ALl PRINCIPLES' 2.08(1) "approximation standard" in lieu of the "best interests"
standard).
142. See Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005). The Court decided
two companion cases, K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005), and Kristine H. v. Lisa R.,
117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005), on the same day as Elisa B. This Article focuses on Elisa B.
because unlike the other two cases, Elisa B. was not biologically related to her child and
had not taken any previous legal action to establish her maternity; therefore the Court relied
exclusively on a gender-neutral application of the UPA's provisions to determine her
maternity. In K.M., the non-gestational mother had donated an ovum to her partner, and so
both women had a physical connection to the children. 117 P.3d at 675-76. In Kristine H.,
the partners had previously signed a stipulated judgment declaring that both of them were
the joint legal parents of the child in question. 117 P.3d at 692.
143. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 663.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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The couple parented the children together, both acknowledging themselves
as the children's mothers, with Elisa being the primary breadwinner and
Emily staying at home. 146 The couple did not officially adopt their
nonbiological children, nor did they register as domestic partners.' 47 The
couple separated at the end of 1999 and initially Elisa continued to provide
financial support to Emily. 148 In early 2001, Elisa ceased providing support
and the district attorney filed a complaint in superior court to establish that
Elisa was49 the parent of the twins, for the purposes of collecting child
support. 1
The superior court found that Elisa was obligated to support the twins
under the theory of de facto parentage and the doctrine of equitable
estoppel.150 The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that Elisa was not a
parent under the UPA.' 5' The California Supreme Court agreed that the
question was governed by the UPA, but found that Elisa was a parent under
the Act. 52 The Court's analysis began by acknowledging that while the
UPA contains separate provisions defining who is a mother and who is a
father, the Act also states that for the purpose of defining a mother and
child relationship, "'[i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions of this part
applicable to the father and child relationship apply. '" 153 After clarifying
that seemingly contrary precedent did not preclude the recognition of two
legal mothers, the Court applied the UPA's father and child provisions to
Elisa.154 California Family Code section 7611 (d) provides that a man is
presumed to be the natural father of a child if "[h]e receives the child into
his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child."'' 55 It was
undisputed that Elisa accepted the children into her home; therefore, the
Court's analysis focused on whether she had openly held out the twins as
her natural children and found that she had. 156 The Court explained that
under previous precedent, awareness of a lack of a biological connection to
a child does not necessarily rebut the presumption of paternity under
Section 7611 (d). 157 Instead, the UPA states that evidence that the presumed
father is not the biological father may be used to rebut the presumption
58 The Court evaluated its
under Section 7611(d) in an appropriateaction.1
previous precedent on what constituted an appropriate action to rebut the
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 664, 670.
Id. at 665 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650(a) (West 2005)).
Id. at 665-69.
Id. at 667 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (d) (West 2005)).
Id. at 667, 669-70.
Id. at 667 (citing In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932, 941 (Cal. 2002)).
Id.
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presumption of paternity and decided that, in the case of Elisa and the
twins, it would not be appropriate to rebut the presumption.1 59 It was
inappropriate to rebut the presumption because to do so would leave the
children with one legal parent, in contradiction to the California
Legislature's implicit recognition of the value of establishing two parents
for every child. 160 The Court also noted that while its dicta in prior
precedent supported rebutting the presumption where the rights and
responsibilities of parenthood would fall on an unwilling person, Elisa's
active participation in the children's creation and her acceptance of the
obligations of parenthood as well as its corresponding rights for the first
it was appropriate for the Court to
years of the children's lives, meant16that
1
find she was the children's mother.
Elisa B. illustrates the potential flexibility of the UPA. Since any
paternity provision of the UPA can be used to establish maternity, the UPA
is a promising tool for some same-sex families. Additionally, as the
discussion below illustrates, the UPA's ability to be applied in a genderneutral fashion makes it an ideal tool for recognizing a third social parent.
Although Elisa B. sets significant legal precedent by relying on the
UPA to recognize two parents of the same gender, it does have several
limitations. First, the opinion contains language explicitly rejecting the
concept of three parents. In Johnson v. Calvert, the Court had previously
stated that California law only recognized one natural mother. 62 However,
as the Court clarified in Elisa B., that language was only relevant to a
situation in which recognizing two natural mothers would result in the
recognition of three legal parents. 163 The Elisa B. Court states, "what we
considered and rejected
in Johnson was the argument that a child could
64
have three parents.'

The second limitation of Elisa B. is that it is not yet clear whether Elisa
B.'s holding will be applied in a gender-neutral manner that encompasses
gay male parents. The Elisa B. Court's recognition that same-sex couples
may co-parent through adoption or domestic partnerships seems to support
extending its holding to gay male couples, since adoption and domestic
partnership laws are gender neutral. 65 However, as one scholar has
recently noted, unlike lesbian couples, male couples may both qualify as
159. Elisa B., 117 P.3d. at 667-69.

160. Id. at 669.
161. Id. at 663-64.
162. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993).
163. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666. The Court also noted that under Sharon S. v. Super.

Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003), the Court had already recognized second-parent adoptions by a
parent of the same gender as the birth parent, and reasoned that there was no reason why the
twins could not have two moms if both parents of an adopted child could be women.
164. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666.
165. Paula Roach, Comment, Parent-Child Relationship Trumps Biology:
California'sDefinition of Parent in the Context of Same-Sex Relationships, 43 CAL. W. L.
REv. 235, 258-59 (2006); see also Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666.
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presumed fathers under California Family Code section 7611(d). For
example, if one of the partners provides the sperm used in the surrogacy
and then raises the child as his own, he will be recognized as both a
biological father and presumed father. 166 His partner, who accepts the child
into his home and holds the child out as a natural child, would also qualify
as a presumed father. Section 7612(b) of the code provides that where
there are competing presumptions of paternity, the presumption that is
based on "weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.' 67
In In re Jesusa V., the California Supreme Court analyzed these
provisions and held that the state's law recognized only one presumed
father. 168 The California courts may feel constrained to interpret this
precedent as barring the recognition of two presumed fathers. In the above
example where one dad is a biological and presumed father, he will likely
prevail as the legally recognized father, leaving his partner without parental
rights. 169 One can also imagine more complex scenarios. For example, if
the gay couple uses a sperm donor to impregnate their surrogate or chooses
not to know which partner's sperm was used, both would only qualify as
presumed fathers and determining which had the weightier claim as a
presumed father would become more difficult. Arguably, the California
courts should limit the applicability of Jesusa V. to situations where there
are competing claims to be the child's second parent, as they did with the
Johnson v. Calvert precedent in deciding Elisa B. 170 In situations where
there are only two individuals interested in obtaining parental rights, it
7
would not be appropriate to rebut the presumption of paternity.' '
The previous discussion illustrates a third limitation of Elisa B. The
holding is limited to the context where there are no competing claims as to
the child's second parent. The basis for the Court's recognition of two
legal mothers in this case was that the alternative would relegate the
children to having only one legal parent. 172 This result would have been in
contradiction to long-standing Supreme Court precedent that children
cannot be punished for their parents' decisions. 73 In a situation with three
parents, depriving a child of one parent will still leave the child with two
parents.

166. Roach, supra note 165, at 259.
167. Id. (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2005)).
168. Id. (citing In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 11 (2004)).
169. Id. at 259-60.
170. Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005).
171. Roach, supranote 165, at 260; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2005).
172. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669.
173. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1967) (holding that denying nonmarital children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother constituted
invidious discrimination); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1981) (finding insufficient
rational basis for denying public elementary education to undocumented children).
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The Court's rejection of multiple parenthood makes sense in the
context of the existing versions of the UPA, which do not allow recognition
of three legal parents. 7 4 Although the Johnson opinion on which the Elisa
B. Court relies did not explicitly base its rejection of multiple parenthood
on the UPA's restrictions, it did limit its decision to the specific facts of the
case before it and did not rely on statutory or constitutional barriers to
support its position.175

Therefore, even in California, Elisa B. does not

present an insurmountable barrier to the recognition of three legal parents,
especially if the UPA itself is modified to achieve 76this goal. This is
precisely the approach advocated by Professor Dowd. 1
Finally, the Elisa B. opinion does not address parentage at birth, further
limiting its application. Although the Court does address Elisa's intention
to create the children with her then-partner as an important element in
equal weight to Elisa's
determining her status as a parent, it appears to 1give
77
parenting actions after the birth of the children.
B.

PROFESSOR NANCY DOWD'S MODEL OF SOCIAL PARENTAGE AT BIRTH

Professor Nancy Dowd's social fatherhood proposal modifies the UPA
to allow for the recognition of social fathers at birth, while also allowing
for the possibility that a child may have more than one father. Although
Dowd's model requires further modification to achieve the goal of
recognizing a third social parent in the context of families headed by samesex couples, her proposal is the best starting point for achieving this goal.
Dowd's proposal offers an ideal starting point because of its reliance on the
UPA, a widely adopted statutory framework, and because it recognizes
social fathers at birth and later in a child's life.

174. See Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 916.
The UPA's recognition of social fathers, however, is bounded by the
requirement that a child have only one father. A social father, most notably
a marital father who is not the genetic father, is strongly supported by the
UPA, but that man takes the sole place available, a principle of one father for
each child.
Id. (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt. (amended 2002)); ("By ignoring the real
possibility that the child will have both an acknowledged father and a presumed father,
Congress left it to the states to sort out which of the men should be recognized as the legal
father.").
See also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 (amended 2002) (limiting the
circumstances and time frame under which a proceeding may be brought to adjudicate the
parentage of a child); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) (containing similar restrictions).
175. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 n.8 (Cal. 1993) (stating that although
it recognized that the high incidence of divorce created many multiple parent arrangements,
the two intended parents in the case before the court were providing for the child adequately
and forcing them to parent in conjunction with the surrogate mother, with whom they had
had only minimal contact since the child's birth, would undermine the wife's role as the
child's mother).
176. See Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 913-14.
177. See Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669-70.
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It should be noted at the outset that Dowd's model focuses on a
population that is in certain ways fundamentally different from the family
structures this Article seeks to support. In particular, Dowd focuses on
78
heterosexual families consisting of one mother and one or more fathers.
However, Dowd's model of social fatherhood is certainly premised in part
on the changing models of fatherhood in society, including those presented
by gay and lesbian families, as she acknowledges. 179 Furthermore, Dowd's
proposal meets the needs of families discussed in this Article because the
model's focus on detaching genetics and economic support duties from
social parenting rights is ideally equipped to meet the needs of the families
discussed in this Article.
Dowd's challenge in creating a model of social parentage at birth was
to "translate the principle of defining fatherhood as nurture into rules that
apply at birth."'' 80 To this end, Dowd proposes four basic principles: (1)
identify a birthfather by asking whether a social father is present at birth;
(2) recognize biological fathers as presumptive birthfathers; (3) permit
more than one legal father; and (4) separate economic responsibilities from
the privileges and rights of social fatherhood.1 81 To achieve her four
principles, Dowd proposes changes to the 2002 UPA as its provisions
provide insufficient support for social and multiple fatherhood at birth.
The 2002 UPA identifies four kinds of fathers: acknowledged fathers,
adjudicated fathers, alleged fathers, and presumed fathers. 8 2 A man
becomes an acknowledged father by signing an acknowledgment of
paternity with the mother on the basis of an alleged genetic relationship
with the child.'8 3 This acknowledgement has equal legal weight as an
adjudication of paternity. 1 84 An adjudicated father is established as the
legal father by a court. Is5 As Dowd notes, an adjudicated father may or
may not be biologically related to the child. 186 An alleged father either
alleges himself, or is alleged by another, to be the genetic father, but has
not yet had his paternity determined. 8 7 Under section 204 of the 2002
178. See Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 912-13.

179. Id. at 910. Dowd's earlier work also acknowledges the unique contributions gay
fathers can make to alter the social norms of fatherhood, and the necessity of overcoming
homophobia in order to embrace fatherhood as a nurturing activity. See DOWD,
FATHERHOOD, supra note 19, at 11-12, 78.

180. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 913.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 915 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102 cmt. (amended 2002)).
183. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 301 (amended 2002); Dowd, Parentage, supra note
20, at 915.
184. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt. (amended 2002); Dowd, Parentage,supra
note 20, at 915.
185. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(2) (amended 2002); Dowd, Parentage,supra note
20, at 915.
186. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 915 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(2)
(amended 2002)).
187. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(3) (amended 2002); Dowd, Parentage,supra note
20, at 915.
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UPA a man is a presumed father if any of the following apply:
(1) He and the mother of the child are married to each other and
the child is born during the marriage;
(2) He and the mother of the child were married to each other and
the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is
terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce, [or after a decree of separation];
(3) Before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child
married each other in apparent compliance with law, even if
the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the
child is born during the invalid marriage or within 300 days
after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of
invalidity, or divorce, [or after a decree of separation];
(4) After the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child
married each other in apparent compliance with law, whether
or not the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and he
voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and:
(A) The assertion is in a record filed with [state agency
maintaining birth records];
(B) He agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the
child's birth certificate; or
(C) He promised in a record to support the child as his own; or
(5) For the first two years of the child's life, he resided in the same
household with the child and openly held out the child as his
own. 188

Presumed fathers may only file disavowals of paternity if there are
acknowledged fathers willing to replace them.1 89 Presumed fathers may
only have their parentage challenged under limited circumstances, even by
established genetic fathers. 190
While Dowd acknowledges that the protections provided to presumed
fathers under the UPA support social fatherhood, she asserts that the UPA
could go further in recognizing social fatherhood by allowing for more than
one social father. For instance, she gives the example of the stepfather who
may act as a social and economic parent to a child, while not being
recognized as a father under the Act.191
Dowd's modifications to the 2002 UPA are based on her conception of
nurture, which includes not only care focused on the well-being of the
188. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (amended 2002).
189. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 302, 303, 305 (amended 2002); Dowd, Parentage,
supra note 20, at 915.
190. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT arts. 3, 6 (amended 2002); Dowd,
Parentage,supra note 20, at 915-16.
191. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 916.
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child, but "a duty of affirmative support and cooperation with other
caregivers."'192 She explains that the concept of "holding out" is the closest
the common law comes to defining social fatherhood, but that this term is
still limited by its inclusion of a requirement of representing a child as a
genetic relative.' 93 Dowd views breaking the link with biology as the key
to fully supporting social fatherhood. 194 Part of breaking this link also
entails separating economic support, an obligation arising from genetic
paternity, which Dowd argues should not confer additional parenting rights,
from care of a child, which she believes should generate social parenting
rights.195 Although at birth there may be less evidence of care than at a
later stage in the child's life, Dowd argues that a social father can be
identified at birth as the man who is present at the birth, has been
committed to the mother and child during the pregnancy, and who
voluntarily acknowledges
and embraces an ongoing commitment to
196
parenting the child.

Dowd next contends that based on prevailing social norms it is
reasonable to expect that nurture will be connected with biological
fatherhood. 197
Her suggested rebuttable presumption, that social
98
biological fathers, also derives from this expectation.
be
will
birthfathers
Using these social norms to establish birthfathers also serves children's
interests in the majority of families. 199 By identifying a biological parent at
birth and presuming his social paternity as well, children are ensured
economic support, and if the presumption proves correct they will also
receive social support and care, without any further action being
necessary. °° If the presumption is rebutted through evidence of lack of
care or negative treatment of mother or child prior to birth, the child will
still be ensured economic support and will still retain the right to acquire
subsequent social fathers.2 '
To achieve the aforementioned goals, Dowd proposes significant
revisions to the 2002 UPA. First, she would remove subsections one
through four of section 204(a)'s presumption of paternity test.20 2 She
would retain only subsection five, making her revised version read as
follows:

192. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 916.

193. Id. at 918-19.
194. Id. at 919.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 922.
198. See id.
199. Families headed by same-sex couples are operating under alternative norms,
which will be addressed further in Part III. B. infra.
200. See Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 925.
201. See id. at 925-26.
202. See supra note 187 and accompanying text for the current wording of section 204(a).
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Section 204. Presumption of Paternity (Revised)
A man is presumed to be the father of a child, if, for the first two
years of the child's life, he resided in the same household with the
child and openly held out the child as his own.2 °3
Dowd would include commentary to this section that elaborated on the
meaning of "holding out," 2 defining it purely in terms of a social
relationship and commitment. 04
Second, Dowd would revise the requirement of voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity in Article three. 0 5 Under Dowd's revision an
acknowledgment of paternity would not require belief in or proof of genetic
paternity. 206 Instead, iitwould simply require evidence of an affirmative,
cooperative relationship with the mother as evidenced through support
during the pregnancy, presence at the birth, and an ongoing commitment to
nurture the child.207 Dowd's model eliminates the existing need for court
proceedings if there is both a presumed father and an acknowledged
father.20 8 Under this model, the genetic father would have economic
20 9
support duties unless the social father voluntarily assumes all duties.
Both fathers might be social fathers based on their actions and the best
interests of the child. 210 As Professor Dowd explains, "[t]he difference
between [the acknowledged father and the presumed father] is that the
acknowledged father has demonstrated his nurture prior to, and at the time
of, birth; the presumed father is recognized only after he has nurtured the
child, when he has done so in the first two years of the child's life. ' 211 Her
revised section 302 reads as follows:
Section 302. Execution of Acknowledgment of Paternity (Revised)
(a) An acknowledgment of paternity must:
(1) Be in a record;
(2) Be signed, or otherwise authenticated, under penalty of
perjury by the mother, unless she is married to the man,
and by the man seeking to establish his paternity;
(3) State whether the man has nurtured the child and is
committed to nurture of the child, by stating his acts with
respect to the child and mother, including but not limited
to: his support of the pregnancy; his presence and support
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 933.
Id.
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 935.
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at the birth of the child; and his commitment to the full
responsibilities of nurturing the child including a
cooperative relationship with the mother;
(4) State that the signatories understand that the
acknowledgment is the equivalent of a judicial
adjudication of paternity of the child.212
Third, Dowd would create several new sections of the UPA and further
articulate certain underlying principles of the Act.213 She would refine the
introductory commentary of the UPA in the following ways: (1) define
social fatherhood and reference the National Center on Fathers and
Families's six categories of indicators of meaningful fatherhood; 214 (2)
define and explain the concept of "birthfather;" and (3) articulate and
explain the meaning of multiple fatherhood.2 15
Dowd would include a new section on genetic paternity based on the
premise that every child should have an identified genetic father. 216 The
section on genetic paternity would read:
Genetic paternity is established if a man voluntarily submits to
genetic testing as defined by Article 5 and is established as the
genetic father pursuant to Section 505, or is an adjudicated father
based on genetic testing under Article 6.
(a) A genetic father is presumed at birth to be a social father
This
with full legal rights and responsibilities.
(1)
father:
genetic
if
the
presumption may be rebutted
failed to support or adversely affected the mother's
pregnancy; (2) was not present for the birth of the child; or
(3) fails to voluntarily embrace a full commitment to the
future care of the child.
(b) A genetic father may be a presumed or acknowledged
father.
(c) A genetic father who does not satisfy (a) or (b) shall have
duties of economic support but no rights of social
relationship or nurture.2 17

212. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 935.

213. Id.
214. Id. at 936. The six factors are: father presence, caregiving, developing child
social competence and academic achievement, cooperative parenting, healthy living, and
material and financial contributions. Id.
215. Id. at 935-37.
216. Id. at 937.
217. Id.
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She would add a second section defining social fatherhood after the
first two years of a child's life:
A man who is not a presumed, acknowledged, genetic, or
adjudicated father of a child who
(a) Marries the mother of the child, or
(b) Who cohabits with a child for a minimum of two years and
has the consent of the mother; may sign an
acknowledgment of social paternity. This status will
terminate with the end of cohabitation or dissolution of the
marriage unless the man adopts the child.218
A third new section would define a child's right to multiple fathers: "A
child is not limited to one legal father. One father will have economic
responsibility for the support of the child but multiple fathers
may be social
219
standard.,
interest
best
the
to
subject
child,
the
to
fathers
C.

MODIFYING PROFESSOR DOWD'S MODEL TO ACHIEVE RECOGNITION
OF THREE-PARENT FAMILIES IN HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY SAME-SEX
COUPLES.

Assuming that a family will be able to achieve recognition of the two
primary parents through existing legal means, the next step will be
establishing social parenting rights for the third parent. The use of the
UPA is superior to other judicially created means of recognizing the family
structure addressed in this Article for two reasons. First, the use of
statutory law as a basis for recognizing this family form may be less likely
to result in different outcomes before different judges. Admittedly, even
under the UPA, courts have come to different conclusions on the
recognition of same-sex parents; 220 however, studies have shown that the
legislative branch may successfully control judicial outcomes when statutes
are properly crafted.22' Second, twenty states have already enacted a
modified version of the UPA,2 22 making the possibility of implementing the
218. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 937-38.
219. Id. at 938.
220. Compare Elisa B v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005), with In re Parentage
of L.B., 89 P.3d 271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). The Washington Supreme Court ultimately
held that the nonbiological co-parent was a de facto parent under Washington common law
and therefore had standing to petition for shared parenting rights and responsibilities. In re
Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 179 (Wash. 2005).
221. Kirk A. Randazzo et al., Checking the Federal Courts: The Impact of
CongressionalStatutes on JudicialBehavior, 68 J.POLITICS 1006, 1016 (2006).
222. Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Washington, and Wyoming enacted the 1973 Act. E-mail from Eric M. Fish, Legislative
Counsel, Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, to Laura Althouse, University
of Oregon School of Law (Mar. 27, 2007, 14:20 PST) (on file with author). Delaware,
North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming have adopted the 2000 UPA and the
2002 amendments to that Act. Id. The Act is currently pending in Nevada. Id.
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changes proposed in this Article more feasible.
The UPA does have its limitations as currently written. As Elisa B.
illustrates, the UPA is currently a gendered document. Ideally, it will
someday either become gender-neutral or explicitly recognize same-sex
parents. However, due to the politically contentious nature of same-sex
parenting in the United States today, legislatures would be unlikely to
adopt a version of the UPA that explicitly recognized same-sex
parenting. 223 Therefore, it is most practical to follow Professor Dowd's
lead and modify the UPA so that it may protect more nontraditional family
forms without explicitly requiring recognition of same-sex parents in the
text of the Act. These modifications would empower judges to continue to
find ways to apply the UPA in a manner that protects children's best
interests and acknowledges the reality of their families.
Dowd's model provides an ideal foundation for creating recognition of
three-parent families headed by same-sex couples because it uses the UPA
as its basis and it allows families to determine relationships at birth,
creating familial security.2 24 The model also translates easily into a means
of determining parentage after birth, which had been the focus of Dowd's
earlier work.225
In applying Dowd's model, this section first discusses her principles
and how they should be conceived of in terms of the goals of this Article.
Next, it applies her UPA revisions and additions to three-parent families
headed by same-sex couples. Finally, it proposes further revisions and
commentary necessary to apply the model to this distinct population.
Before applying Dowd's model to three-parent families, it is
appropriate to identify one key distinction between the family forms Dowd
focuses on and the ones this Article addresses. For Dowd's population, she
assumes that a birthmother is readily identifiable; she then uses her
framework to recognize one or two fathers at birth, and leaves open the
possibility of recognizing additional fathers later in the child's life.
This Article assumes that two parents of the same gender have been
legally recognized as the parents of a child and applies Dowd's framework
to recognize one additional person, a third social parent. Theoretically, this
means the child already has sufficient economic and social support, but that
the family desires to provide an additional source of social support for the
benefit of the child. Overall, this means that the task at hand is simpler
than the one Dowd confronted, although some modifications are necessary
to achieve that goal using Dowd's model. It also means that Dowd's first
two goals - identifying a birthfather and presuming that nurture and
223. The earlier discussion on Massachusetts' battle over same-sex marriage
illustrated the reservations legislatures have about embracing gay rights, as compared to the
courts. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
224. See Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 913.
225. See generally DOWD, FATHERHOOD, supra note 19.
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biology will be connected - are less important for these families. Dowd's
purpose in including these two goals is to ensure that a child has two
parents providing economic and social support at birth, where possible, and
to acknowledge prevailing social norms. In same-sex families who want to
include a third social parent, the child already has sufficient support and the
prevailing social norm that biology and social parenthood are connected
does not apply to both parents, as only one of the parents can be a
biological parent of the child.
1.

Applying Professor Dowd's Principles

Although Dowd applies her model only to fathers, the structure of the
UPA allows for easy application of her revisions to both genders. Section
106 of the UPA - which was crucial to applying the paternity sections of
the UPA to the nonbiological mother in Elisa B. - remains unchanged in
the 2002 UPA used by Dowd.226 As mentioned, section 106 provides that
227
determinations of paternity apply to determinations of maternity.
Therefore, Dowd's modifications and additions to the UPA should apply
equally to both mothers and fathers.
The first principle under Dowd's model is identifying a "birthfather" a social father who has demonstrated acts of nurture toward the child and
has made an affirmative commitment to cooperative parenting with the
mother.2 2 8 Dowd proposes that the birthfather should be identified in order
to allow for recognition of this social function at the birth of the child.229 In
order to serve the needs of same-sex families, this goal could be modified
to identifying a "birthparent" - a social mother or father who has
demonstrated actions of nurture toward the child and has a cooperative
parenting relationship with the child's two primary parents.
Dowd's second principle of recognizing biological fathers as
presumptive birthfathers is geared towards acknowledging prevailing social
norms of parenthood while still focusing on the importance of social
parenting. 230 Although not crucial to three-parent families, the presumption
also works for these families, if applied in a gender-neutral manner. For
example, if, like the lesbian couple in A.A. v. B.B.,2 1 1 the lesbian co-parents
use a known sperm donor whom they also intended to be a social father, the
presumption that this individual is both a genetic and social father is
appropriate. If the couple wants the third parent to have economic and
social rights, as that couple did, the presumption may work perfectly. If the
couple wants to limit parenting rights to social rights, additional revision,

226. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 106 (amended 2002).

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 913.
See id.
See id.
A.A. v. B.B., 83 O.R.3d 561 (2007).
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or at minimum, a more liberal interpretation, of some UPA provisions may
be necessary, as will be discussed further below.
In the context of a gay couple that wants their surrogate to be a third
parent, the presumption works in a similar fashion. If the surrogate donates
her own egg, we presume that genetic and social motherhood are
coextensive in the surrogate by applying the principle of identifying a
"birthfather" to identifying a "birthmother." In the context of a gay couple
that wishes to recognize a third social parent who is not related to the child
through genetics or surrogacy, the presumption would be rebutted by the
donor or surrogate's relinquishment of parental rights. The third social
parent could achieve recognition through a revised version of Dowd's
proposed section 302, which allows for the execution of an
acknowledgment of paternity (or maternity).
The third principle Dowd articulates permits more than one legal
father.232 My proposal begins with the assumption that a child either
already has more than one legal father, as would the child of a gay couple,
or will only have one legal father, as would be the case if the child's
parents are a lesbian couple and a third male social parent, a father, is
recognized. Therefore, I would rearticulate this principle as permitting a
child to have three legal parents, or permitting a child to have a third social
parent.
Dowd's final principle separates economic responsibility from the
privileges and rights of social fatherhood.233 Dowd's model allows for this
dichotomy by requiring genetic fathers to be obligated to support their
children. By requiring genetic fathers to take on economic responsibility
for any children they father, Dowd ensures, at least theoretically, that each
child has two biological parents supporting them. The economic support of
both biological parents meets the child's financial needs, and separating
this duty from social rights allows for other father-figures to come into the
child's life without being financially obligated to the child.
Disentangling economic and social rights also works for the families
this Article addresses with the only distinction being that genetics are not
determinative of parentage in same-sex families. Under my model, the
child's financial needs are met by his or her two primary parents who,
although they may or may not be genetic parents, have both economic and
social duties towards the child. As in Dowd's model, ensuring support
from two parents allows a third social parent to serve a purely social need,
rather than an economic one. Our visions of the benefits of this separation
are similar. Dowd reasons that more men who are not genetically related to
a child might be willing to take on a legally recognized role in a child's life
if doing so does not economically tie them to the child. The same could be

232. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 913.
233. Id.
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said for social parents and their commitment to the child of a gay or lesbian
couple. A known donor may want to be a social parent to the child of the
lesbian couple to whom he has donated sperm, but may fear economic
obligation. Similarly, surrogates may also fear such obligations.
Dowd's primary change to the 2002 UPA is her revision of section
204.234 She abolishes the marital presumption by removing subsections
204(a)(l)-(4), leaving only the requirement that a man must reside with a
child and openly hold out the child as his own for the first two years of the
child's life.2 35 The third social parent in a family headed by a same-sex
couple is unlikely to cohabitate with the child,236 making this provision
inapplicable to such families. The earlier example of the parenting
arrangement of Natalie and Kim and their daughter's social parent Mark
illustrated this problem. 237 Natalie, Kim, and their daughter lived in
northern California; Mark resided in L.A., made monthly trips to visit his
biological
daughter, and participated in some decisions regarding her well8
being.

23

One solution to this issue is to modify Dowd's section 302,239 which
would allow a third social parent to be recognized at birth through an
execution of acknowledgement of paternity. Dowd's section 302 provides
that an acknowledgment of paternity must be signed by the mother in the
absence of a marriage.24 ° In the context of gay and lesbian couples, the
acknowledgement would either need to be signed by the fathers, with no
mother signing, or by both mothers, rather than a singular mother.
This issue could be resolved by altering the language further. Instead
of requiring a "mother" to sign, the provision could require the child's legal
parent or parents to sign. This revision would still allow the provision to
meet the needs of families headed by a heterosexual parent or parents. If a
single pregnant mother wants to allow a nonbiological male partner to
acknowledge his paternity of the child, she can be the "legal parent" who
signs under section 302. The genetic father of her child will not be a legal
parent until paternity testing establishes his identity so he will not be able
to sign in lieu of the mother, nor will his signature be required. The genetic
father of her child can still be identified under Dowd's new section that
provides for establishing genetic paternity, and both fathers will be
recognized under her new section allowing for multiple fathers.24'

234. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 932-33.
235. Id.
236. See SULLIVAN, supra note 9, at 190-200 (discussing a variety of donor-extended
kinship arrangements).
237. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
238. Id.
239. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 935.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 938.
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In contrast, Dowd's new provision on genetic paternity 242 is at odds
with the family forms this Article addresses. In same-sex families,
establishing genetic paternity is not necessary to ensure support for the
child, as it may be in heterosexual families. Parenthood in same-sex
families is often based on intent rather than biology. In fact, many lesbian
couples do not want the identity of their child's genetic father known. Gay
partners who use a surrogate may also choose not to know which partner's
sperm was ultimately used.243 However, this incongruence is fixable.
Dowd's purpose in including this provision is to ensure that each child
receive economic support from his or her biological mother and father. In
the family structure my model addresses, the child already has two parents,
and so establishing genetic paternity for the purpose of ensuring economic
support is unnecessary. Using the example of Natalie and Kim once again,
their child already has two mothers providing social and economic support.
Although the family wants Mark, her biological father, to be involved
socially, establishing his genetic paternity to enforce economic support is
not what the family desires, nor is it necessary to protect the best interests
of their child because she already has two legal parents. In order to allow
for the inapplicability of this section in the context of same-sex families
looking to allow a third social parent, I would include commentary that
explains its limited applicability to a child who already has two parents
with full legal rights and responsibilities and to a child conceived through
assisted reproduction or a gestational agreement.
Social Acknowledged Paternity, another new section proposed by
Dowd, 244 does facilitate the goals of three-parent families headed by a
same-sex couple, but would need minor modifications. As written, the new
section mirrors other sections for establishing paternity, in its inclusion of a
requirement of two years of cohabitation with the child.245 I propose
modifying this requirement to allow a father to become a social father after
a child's birth either through two years of cohabitation or two years of
demonstrated acts of nurture, cooperation, and support of the child's legal
parents. The language Dowd employs in her revised section 302246 could
easily be modified and used here. My proposed section would read as
follows:

242. See Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 937.
243. The gay male couple discussed in Bellafante, supra note 10, chose not to know
who was the biological father of their child.
244. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 937-38.
245. Id. at 938.
246. See id. at 935.

Summer 2008]

THREE'S COMPANY?

Social Acknowledged Paternity
A man who is not a presumed, acknowledged, genetic, or
adjudicated father of a child who
(a) Marries the mother of a child, or
(b) Who cohabitates with a child for a minimum of two years,
or who demonstrates through his actions consistent nurture
of the child, including but not limited to cooperation with
the child's legal parent(s) for a minimum of two years, and
has the consent of the child's legal parent(s), may sign an
acknowledgment of social paternity.
If we again recall the family situation of Natalie, Kim, and Mark, this
revised section would allow Mark, who does not live with his biological
child, to establish his social paternity through two years of visitation and
cooperation in family decision making with Natalie and Kim.
The new section on Multiple Fathers may work as written if we assume
that courts will interpret the phrase "[o]ne father will have economic
responsibility for the support of a child ' 247 to be met when a child has two
legal parents providing economic support, regardless of their gender. This
interpretation is conceivable under section 106's mandate to apply
determinations of paternity to maternity, but it could be rewritten to avoid
the necessity of making this interpretation. It might instead read, "A child
is not limited to one legal father. Two parents will have economic
responsibilities for the support of the child but multiple fathers may be
social fathers to the child, subject to the best interest standard." This
revised version still requires using section 106 to apply the word "fathers"
to social mothers, but eliminates some of the ambiguity in interpretation.
For example, if we apply this to a gay male couple using a surrogate as a
social mother, we would identify two parents who have economic support
duties - in this case the child's two dads. Under the multiple fathers
provision, the child is allowed to have multiple fathers. Under the UPA,
the provisions applicable to paternity apply to establishing maternity as
well. We would then apply this provision to the surrogate and find that
under this section she may be recognized as a social parent.
My application of Dowd's principles and 2002 UPA revisions to threeparent families headed by a same-sex couple shows that the UPA can be
stretched to meet the needs of this unique subpopulation, albeit with a need
to constantly apply the mandate in section 106 that provisions for
establishing paternity apply to establishing maternity. The ultimate goal
should be to simplify matters by creating a new version of the UPA, which
is either entirely gender-neutral or explicitly addresses same-sex parenting
and multiple parenthood. It should be obvious that these changes are likely
247. Dowd, Parentage,supra note 20, at 938.
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to be met with significant opposition. As mentioned earlier, judges, like
those who comprised the Elisa B. Court, may adapt the UPA to fit the
needs of a child who would otherwise be denied a parental relationship or
economic support. However, convincing legislatures to adopt an amended
UPA that expressly or implicitly condones same-sex parenting is probably
an unrealistic goal at present.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
As a society, we are far from embracing family structures that are at
odds with prevailing social norms. Our failure to legally recognize these
families is the modem day equivalent to punishing non-marital children in
an attempt to alter their parents' behavior. Ultimately, ignoring the needs
of children in order to discourage or punish their parents' choices cannot
stand the test of time. In the meantime, we must continue to use creative
means for preserving children's nurturing relationships with adult
caregivers, something that is in the best interests of children.
This Article has argued that a modified version of the UPA, applied in
a gender-neutral fashion, can allow for the legal recognition of a third
social parent in same-sex families. Whether the proposal in this Article is
constitutional deserves further exploration. Some scholars have argued that
dividing up parental obligations results in too little substantive parental
authority, and therefore contradicts the Constitution's grant of parental
autonomy. 248 David Meyer has argued that the ALl Principles are the most
expansive definition of parental rights that can survive under the
Constitution. 249 Meyer argues that the intrusion on the child-rearing liberty
of traditional parents that results when non-parents' visitation or decisionmaking rights are preserved is constitutional where a non-parent can
' 250
establish themselves as a "de facto parent" or a "parent by estoppel.
Meyer's conclusion appears to stem from two facts. First, the ALl
Principles' definitions of de facto parents and parents by estoppel require
either a belief in a biological relationship with the child, an agreement with
the legal parent, or a parenting failure on the part of the legal parent.251
These requirements ensure that at some point the legal parents have either
acquiesced to or supported the relationship between the child and the nonparent. Second, where a non-parent has lived with a child and taken on
parenting duties on par with the duties assumed by the traditional parents, it
is easier to establish that eliminating that relationship is detrimental to the
child, making the outcome constitutional under the Troxel Court's plurality

248. See Meyer, supra note 122, at 55 (discussing the theories of various scholars in
regards to this issue).
249. Id. at 64.
250. Id.
251. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 122, § 2.03(b)-(c).
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opinion.
As discussed in Part I, in Troxel, the United States Supreme
Court struck down Washington state's third-party visitation statute and a
plurality opinion found that the statute's breadth violated parents'
fundamental autonomy rights with respect to child-rearing decisions
because it allowed any person to request visitation without requiring that
the legal parent be unfit or that the challenger allege that detriment to the
child.2 53 Under my model, recognizing a third social parent also arises
from an agreement with the legal parent. However, although the resulting
intrusion on the legal parents' rights is less because the social parent is not
given rights in parity with the legal parents, it may be more difficult to
establish that preserving a purely social relationship is necessary to avoid
detriment to the child. Furthermore, the requirements for establishing
paternity under the UPA are not identical to the provisions for qualifying as
a de facto parent or a parent by estoppel under the ALI Principles and so a
constitutional analysis of both Professor Dowd's model and my own is
needed.

252. For an in-depth discussion of the Troxel opinion, see supra notes 83-94 and
accompanying text.
253. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2000).
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